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NOTES
PROBLEMS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES, SETTLEMENTS, AND
PROTECTION OF THE ESTATE ARISING FROM A
MINOR'S TORT CLAIM
I. INTRODUCTION
At common law, and in Missouri today, "A 'minor' is any person
who is under the age of twenty-one years... .- All forty-eight states
have adopted legislation granting minors certain special rights and
privileges and imposing on them certain disabilities2 to protect the
immature and inexperienced minors from their own improvident acts,
and to guard them against exploitation by those of more mature
years.' Despite the exceptional safeguards generally afforded minors
by state statutes, in many instances the interests of these persons
are not adequately protected. Most members of the Missouri Bar
believe this to be true in Missouri. Considering the Missouri provi-
sions relating to the guardianship of minors, the prosecution of
minors' suits, and minors' contracts, certain statutory "gaps" are
thought to exist when a minor has a tort claim which he wishes to
settle or prosecute to judgment.-
Assume l, a minor, has a tort claim against T, tort-feasor. Three
distinct problems are raised by this basic situation: (1) M, or M and
hli parent, may wish to enter into a settlement with T rather than
prosecute the claim to judgment. But T will be reluctant to settle
becauseI M is not bound by his contracts unless he affirms them after
reaching his majority., M may therefore effectively avoid a release
given to T and collect from T a second time. (2) When M seeks to
employ an attorney, the attorney, like T, may be reluctant to deal
with the minor because of the latter's power to avoid his contractual
obligation to pay the attorney's fees. (3) If M is awarded a judg-
ment, a further problem arises in regard to the preservation of the
proceeds of the judgment for the minor until he reaches his majority.
The belief held by some judges and attorneys-that theexisting law
1. Mo. PROB. CODE § 47-5.010(4) (1956).
2. 5 VERNER, AMERIcAN FAMILY LAws 3 (1938).
:3. West St. Louis Trust Co. v. Brokaw, 232 Mo. App. 209, 102 S.W.2d 792
1 37).
4. Fenn v. Hart Dairy Co., 231 Mo. App. 1005, 83 S.W.2d 120 (1935).
,-. While similar or other problems may eist in some other areas of the law
concerning minors, this note considers only the problems relating to the minor's
tort claim.
o% Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431,060 (Vernon 1949).
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is inadequate to deal with these problems-has led them to adopt
various practices to bridge the statutory gaps.7 During the course
of this discussion the existing law will be examined to determine
whether such practices are justified, and if so, whether they are
acceptable means to accomplish the desired ends. Corrective legisla-
tion will be suggested in those areas in which it is believed that either
the existing law or the present practices are not satisfactory.
II. EXISTING LAW8
The existing law relating to the problems presented will be con-
sidered in three groups: probate jurisdiction of minors and minors'
estates, rights of parents, and the method by which a minor may
prosecute his suit, including the powers of his representative in
that suit.
(a) Probate Jurisdiction of Minors and Minors' Estates
"A guardian is one appointed by a court to have the care and cus-
tody of the person or estate, or of both, of a minor. . . ."I (Emphasis
added.) The Missouri Constitution confers on the probate court juris-
diction "of all matters pertaining to ...the appointment of guar-
dians and curators of minors. . . ."1 Complementary to this consti-
tutional provision is the statute defining the general jurisdiction of
the probate court, which also provides that the probate court shall
have jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to the appointment of
guardians. 1" These provisions have been construed as vesting in the
probate court exclusive original jurisdiction to appoint guardians. -
Section 475.130 provides that the duties of guardians shall be per-
formed "upon such terms as may be prescribed by the probate
court,"'1 3 thereby subjecting the control and management of minors'
estates to the supervision of the probate court.1 4 Since the probate
court also has exclusive original jurisdiction to appoint guardians,
7. During the course of this note, and especially in the section entitled Present
Practice, reference will be made to various attitudes, practices, and procedures of
courts and attorneys which currently exist. As authority for all such statements,
the writer consulted several attorneys and judges.
8. Unless otherwise indicated statutes under which various cases have been
decided were, as far as is pertinent to this discussion, essentially identical to
statutes in force today.
9. Mo. PEoB. CODE § 475.010 (1956). This definition is expressly made appli-
cable to all code provisions relating directly to guardians unless the context of a
particular section indicates otherwise.
10. Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 16 (1945).
11. Mo. PROB. CODE § 472.020 (1956).
12. Ross v. Pitcairn, 179 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1944) ; In re Estate of Mills, 349 Mo.
611, 162 S.W.2d 807 (1942).
13. Mo. PRoB. CODE § 475.130 (1956). The predecessor to this section used the
word "authorized" in place of the word "prescribed." See Mo. REv. STAT. §
457.420 (1949).
14. Fenn v. Hart Dairy Co., 231 Mo. App. 1005, 83 S.W.2d 120 (1935).
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and has the power to control them in the performance of their duties,
the court indirectly acquires exclusive original jurisdiction in the
control and management of minors' estates.
Among the powers of a court-appointed guardian is one which
enables him, with the approval of the probate court, to bind the
minor's estate contractuallyYt" With this power the guardian, upon
approval of the probate court, can settle a minor's claim and execute
a release to the tort-teasor which is binding on the minor. Sinilarly,
the guardian can contractually bind the minor to pay the attorney's
fees. Since the guardian of the minor's estate is the proper person
to prosecute the minor's claim," he has the right to receive the pro-
.oeds of any judgment. The funds in the hands of the guardian are
adequately protected, for the guardian is constantly under the super-
vision of the probate court and is required to execute a bond before
entering upon the duties of his office,"s the bond being conditional on
the faithful administration of the estate.1 9
In light of these guardianship provisions, the problems relating to
settlements and attorneys' fees are capable of easy solution. But it
is contended by some attorneys that the provisions, although protect-
ing the minor from any malfeasance of the guardian, still do not
aderjuately insure that the proceeds of the judgment will be available
for the minor when he reaches his majority.
Whien a guardian is appointed there are certain costs of administer-
mg the estate which are chargeable to the estate." The bonding com-
panies charge a minimum annual premium of ten dollars for the
required bond. Attorneys' fees for filing the necessary annual re-
ports' ender the estate liable for a minimum of twenty-five to fifty
dollars annually. With other incidental fees probate attorneys esti-
mate the annual minimum cost to a small estate is from sixty-five to
seventy-five dollars. If the minor were age five and his claim produced
• %I,0,approximately $1,0O to $1,200 would be expended on these
administration costs before he reached majority; if ten years of age,
1r. Campbell v. Campbell, 350 Mo. 169, 165 S.W.2d 851 (1942); West St Louis
Tr ust Co. v. Brokaw, 232 Me. App. 209, 102 S.W.2d 792 (1937).
I;. Mo. PROB. CODE § 475.135 (1956) provides that, "No contract shall hind the
i-state of any minor ... unless the same is made by the guardian with the ap-
proval of the probate court or made by the ward with the consent of the guardian
and a~ktpioval of the court." See Fenn v. Hart Dairy Co., 231 Mo. Ap1005, 83
SAV.2d 120 (1935); Houck v. Bridwell, 28 Mo. App. 644 (1888).
17. Mo. PROD. COon § 475.260 (1) (19-56) - id. § 475.130 (3). See also Am v.
A i v, 264 Mo. 19, 173 SAY. 1062 (1915) ; Clark v. Crosswhite. 28 Mo. App. 34
1877).
18. Mo. PRoD. CODE § 475.100 (1956). The bond must be double the amount of
the estate, unless there is a corporate surety in which case the bond required is
"sual to the size of the estate,
Iti.d, § 47317(2),
20. Id. § 475,100.
2I. . 4751.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
approximately $700 to $800. Adding to these costs the initial attor-
ney's fee for prosecuting or settling the claim, it becomes apparent
that if the claim is small, securing the appointment of a guardian is
not feasible despite annual interest the proceeds may earn, for all or
a large part of the estate may be consumed by administration costs.
This defeats the very purpose of requiring a guardian, i.e., to protect
and preserve the ward's estate.2 Of course this objection becomes
invalid if the parent, who is generally appointed guardian, is willing
to pay all the expenses of administration. Some lawyers have stated
that there are many instances in which the parent feels unable to pay
these expenses, or declines to pay them because he feels he should not
be required to do so. In fact, many times the parent is more inter-
ested in devising means to procure money from the estate (commonly
called "milking" the estate) than in paying money to maintain it.
At any rate the law should provide means for maintaining the estate
independent of the attitudes or means of the particular parent.
The larger the claim the more feasible it becomes to have a guardian
appointed, since a large estate can bear the costs of administration.
The remainder of this note is concerned with the smaller claims
which would be absorbed wholly or to a great extent by administra-
tion costs.
It has also been suggested that the guardian-probate-court route
is not used by attorneys because the fee they will be awarded by the
court will be a "reasonable fee"-which may be as low as 10 per cent
of the claim. On the other hand, if the attorney can work through
some procedure outside the probate court he will receive the usual
25-33 per cent contingent fee. If this is true it is submitted that pro-
bate judges are taking an unrealistic attitude in regard to the fees
they award an attorney representing a minor in a personal injury
case. The contingent fee is justified on policy arguments quite
familiar to members of the legal profession. It is submitted that
these policy arguments are just as strong whether the attorney is
prosecuting or settling a tort claim for an adult, or prosecuting or
settling a tort claim for a minor under the supervision of the guardian
and probate court.
Since the appointment of the guardian is not feasible because of
the diminution of the estate by costs and fees, and, possibly, also
because of the attorney's refusal to enter the probate court because
of the reduction in his fee, there remains to be considered whether
some other representative of the minor exists who has the power to
eliminate all or some of the problems presented.
22. See id. § 475.130.
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(b) Rights and Powers of Parents
In most instances there is no occasion to have a guardian appointed
for a minor. The law recognizes parents as natural guardians" of
their children and they have the right to the care and custody of their
children's persons.- , The parent has the power to control and manage
the estate of the minor which is derived from the parent,2 but the
law requires a guardian to be appointed when the minor acquires
an estate from a source other than the parentY Therefore the parent
has no authority to control or manage the minor's estate derived from
a fort claim. It is quite generally believed that this authority is with-
held from the parent because of the lack of any assurance that the
estate will remain intact for the benefit of the minor. Nor does the
parent have the power to bind the minor's estate by contract.Y7 There-
fore, the parent can neither execute to the tort-feasor a release bind-
ing on the minor, nor make a contract for the attorney's fees which
will bind the minor.-9
(r) Powers and Rights of a Minor's Special Representative
;a a Particular Suit
So that a minor is assured of having the benefit of adult agency
and judgment in the prosecution of his law suits, ° the law provides
that: "Suits by infants may be commenced and prosecuted, either:
First, by the guardian or curator of such infant; or second, by a next
friend appointed for him in such suit."31 Therefore, when the minor
has no guardian his suit may be prosecuted by another represen-
tative-a "next friend."33 The appointment of the next friend is to
2.Henceforth the term, "guardian" refers to a guardian appointed by the
probate court and the term "parent"' refers to the natural guardian.
24. Mo. Non. CoDA §475.025 (195).25. Ibid. See also ehmen v. Portmann, 153 Mo. App. 240, 133 S.W. 104(1910) (parent as natural guardian can sue for injury to minor's estate which
estate was derived from the parent).
26. Mo. PRon. Conw § 475.030(2) (1956).
27. Fenn v. Hart Dairy Co., 231 Mo. App. 1005, 83 S.W.2d 120 (1935). See
also note 16 mpra.
28. Kirk v. Middlebrook, 201 Mo. 245, 100 S.W. 450 (1907).
29. Fenn v. Hart Dairy Co 231 Mo. App. 1005, 83 S.W.2d 120 (1935).
30. West St. Louis Trust o. v. Brokaw, 232 Mo. App. 209, 102 S.W.2d 792(1937).
31. Mo. ANNx. STAT. § 507.110 (Vernon 1949).
'52. Mo. PRon. Cows § 475.260(1) (1956) (actions between the ward and third
persons are to be prosecuted and defended by the guardian); Clark v. Crosswhite,28 Mo. App. 34 (1877) (statute requiring infant to sue by next friend does not
apply where he has a duly appointed guardian).
33. It does not appear to be settled whether the minor can sue through his
ent as natural guardian without the parent being appointed next friend.
arilier cases held that a minor may sue through his paren where the minor had
no appointed guardian. Brandon v. Carter, 119 Mo. 572, 24 S.W. 1035 (1894);
West St. Louis Trust Co. v. Brokaw, 232 Mo. App. 209, 102 S.W.2d 792 (1937).
The more recent case of Cox v. Wrinkle, 267 S.W2d 648 (Mo. 1954), in dictum
stated where there is no duly appointed guardian the statute requiring the a-
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be made by the court in which the suit is intended to be brought 4
and no proceedings are to be had in the cause until a next friend is
appointed.35
The function of the next friend is to aid the minor in the prosecu-
tion of the particular suit and his authority continues only to the
final determination of the cause.36 When the judgment is paid and
the next friend enters satisfaction, the "next friend" status is termi-
nated. The court loses jurisdiction over both the minor and his repre-
sentative.37 The next friend, however, has the right to receive the
proceeds of the judgment at the conclusion of the suit3s In Stephens
v. Curtner and West St. Louis Trust Co. vu. Brokaw, 40 the courts
reasoned that since a court can, if it desires, require the next friend
to execute a bond at the commencement of a suit,41 and as the pur-
pose of the bond is to assure the court that the funds will be safe-
guarded for the infant, the legislature must have intended that the
next friend receive the proceeds.
pointment of a next friend is applicable and a next friend must be appointed as
representative of the minor.
From the point of view of the infant it makes little difference whether the
parent can represent the minor without being appointed next friend. Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 511.260 (Vernon 1949) provides that:
When a verdict shall have been rendered in any cause, the judgment therein
shall not be stayed ... reversed, impaired or in any way affected by reason
of the following imperfections, omissions, defects, matters or things, or any
of them, namely:
(7) For any party under twenty-one years of age having appeared by at-
torney, if the verdict or judgment be for him.
The cases have given full effect to this provision. Jones v. Steele, 36 Mo. 324(1865) (failure to appoint a next friend was an error that could be cured even
after the rendition of a jury verdict as the law is very liberal in upholding pro-
ceedings where the infant has derived a benefit), approved in State ex 'el. Mis-
souri Pac. R.R. v. Cox, 306 Mo. 27, 267 S.W. 382 (1924). The defendant should
be cautious, however, and require that the next friend be a ppointed, for if an
infant proceeds without a next friend the minor will not be bound by the judg-
ment if the result is unfavorable to him. Hanlin v. Burk Bros. Meat & Provision
Co., 174 Mo. App. 462, 160 S.W. 547 (1913). The defendant may be required to
defend the action a second time if no next friend is appointed and it is deter-
mined that a parent cannot represent the minor without being appointed next
friend.
Also, attorneys should be sure an infant's special representative is appointed
where the attorney is prosecuting a suit against an infant. Where no guardian
ad litem, infant defendant's special representative, is appointed a judgment
against the minor is voidable by the minor. Reineman v. Larkin, 222 Mo. 156, 121
S.W. 307 (1909); Gamache v. Prevost, 71 Mo. 84 (1879).
34. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 507.120 (Vernon 1949).
35. Id. § 507.170.
36. West St. Louis Trust Co. v. Brokaw, 232 Mo. App. 209, 102 S.W.2d 792(1937).
37. Id. at 214, 102 S.W.2d at 795.
38. Ibid.; Stephens v. Curtner, 205 Mo. App. 255, 222 S.W. 497 (1920) (dic-
tum).
39. 205 Mo. App. 255, 222 S.W. 497 (1920) (dictum).
40. 232 Mo. App. 209, 102 S.W.2d 792 (1937).
41. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 507.150 (Vernon 1949).
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Since the next friend has the right to receive the proceeds and the
circuit court loses jurisdiction over him after the suit, the question
arises whether the statutes and case law adequately safeguard the
funds in the hands of the next friend for the benefit of the minor.
The court mdy, if it desires, require the next friend to execute a bond
conditioned upon the next friend's accounting to the minor for all
money received.' The courts feel, however, that to require a bond
in every case would often put "a lion in the way of the infant secur-
ing his rights in court"' because the next friend, generally the parent,
may not be able to meet the requirements of the bonding companies.
In fact, the court in Aley v. Missouri Pac. R. R.,44 suggested that the
legislature did not make the bonding requirement mandatory for this
very reason. The result is that the minor may be precluded from
entering court because of the next friend's failure to secure a bond,
or, if the court requires no bond, the next friend may leave court with
funds of the minor which are not safeguarded. It seems, however,
that all the next friend has the right to do with the funds is to hold
them. He has no right to make any disposition of the funds, for such
authority rests in the guardian and probate court.45 Of course, if the
funds are expended by the next friend and are not made available to
the minor, the minor will have a cause of action to recover them. Just
what this cause of action may be worth depends on the financial
responsibility of the next friend. If he is so destitute the court feels
it cannot require bond of him, it hardly seems likely the infant has
much hope of recovery if the funds are dissipated.
The next friend, like the parent, has no power to bind the minor's
estate by contract.- Nor does he acquire such power by obtain-
ing the trial court's approval of the contract,4 7 for it will be recalled
that the control and management of the minor's estate is in the exclu-
sive original jurisdiction of the probate court. Therefore, the next
friend cannot bind the minor's estate for attorneys' fees, 48 nor does
he have the power to effect a settlement of the minor's claim.49
42. Ibd.; Aley v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 211 Mo. 460, 111 S.w. 102 (1908); Hen-
derIson v. Kansas City, 177 Mo. 477, 76 S.W. 1045 (1903).
4:. Aley v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 211 Mo. 460, 478, 111 S.W. 102, 107 (1908).
44. 11,4.
45. See text at note 15 upra.
46. Campbell v. Campbell, 350 Mo. 169, 165 S.W.2d 851 (1942); Dillon v.
Bowles, 77 Mo. 603 (1883).
47. Campbell v. Campbell, .u pra note 46; Gilliland v. Bondurant, 332 Mo. 881,
-9 S.W.2d 679 (1933) ; Robison v. Floesch Constr. Co., 291 Mo. 34, 236 S.W. 332
(1921).
48. Penn v. Hart Dairy Co., 231 Mo. App. 1005, 83 S.W.2d 120 (1935).
49. Campbell v. Campbell, 350 Mo. 169, 165 S.W.2d 851 (1942); Gilliland v.
Bondurant, 332 Mo. 881, 59 S.W.2d 679 (1933).
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III. PRESENT PRACTICE
As noted previously, the guardian with the approval of the probate
court has the right to deal with the problems of settlements and attor-
neys' fees; also the minor's funds are theoretically protected in the
hands of the guardian, but costs may in effect dissipate a large part
of the estate. The parent, not being appointed by the probate court,
lacks the power to give a release or make a contract for attorneys'
fees which will be binding on the minor; nor does the parent have
the authority to control the minor's estate unless such estate is de-
rived from the parent. The next friend, like the parent, cannot con-
tractually bind the infant, though he does have thie right to receive
the proceeds, in which case the funds may not be adequately protected
for the minor. While all these problems are not present in all cases,
e.g., the parent may pay administration costs of guardianship, or pay
the attorney and execute bond as next friend, they have recurred fre-
quently enough for attorneys and courts to adopt certain practices
to avoid them; the practices have since become standard procedure
in most cases.
(a) Settlements
If during the course of a lawsuit in which the plaintiff is an infant
the parties reach a settlement, it is generally conceded that the circuit
court has the power to approve the settlement and bind the minor
by a judgment.50 The court should, however, ascertain whether the
settlement is fair and reasonable, having due regard for the interests
of the infant.5 '
When the parties have reached a settlement before a suit is insti-
tuted, several methods are employed to protect the alleged tort-feasor
against any further liability. The most common procedure is the
so-called "friendly suit.152 The mechanics of the friendly suit are
simple. After settlement is reached the minor's parent makes appli-
cation to be appointed next friend, consents to act as such, and is
appointed by the court. Then suit is instituted by filing a petition;
the defendant is served with summons (defendant may waive sum-
mons and enter a voluntary appearance), appears and answers. The
defendant generally denies liability, but "offers a judgment" which
the plaintiff accepts; or the plaintiff asks for a judgment which the
defendant accepts. In either event the suit is a sham. The amount
has always been previously agreed upon and judgment is entered
50. STATE OF NEW YORK, JUDICIAL COUNcIL's THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT
AND STUDIES 195 (1947) (hereinafter referred to as JuD. COUNCIL REP'T).
51. Campbell v. Campbell, 350 Mo. 169, 165 S.W.2d 851 (1942).
52. JUD. COUNCIL REP'T 195, 204-05; Dixon, Settlement of Minors' Tort Claims,
92 TRUSTS & ESTATES 728 (1953).
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accordingly.- The friendly suit is a mere procedural device used to
invoke the jurisdiction of a court"4 so that the settlement already
agreed to by the parties can be approved as though it had been
arrived at during the course of a bona fide lawsuit.
Unfortunately, the term "friendly suit" carries with it a connota-
tion of fraud or corruption. As stated by the Missouri Supreme Court
in Robison v. Floesch Construction Co.,5 the friendly suit is not a
suit in fact but merely a screen "contrived to conceal the real trans-
action. the contract of settlement . . . having for its purpose the
foreclosure of the plaintiff's rights to disaffirm and repudiate his
folly . . . ." While it is true the whole transaction is to prevent a
subsequent disaffirmance or repudiation of a settlement, it is not
necessarily true that the settlement is folly-in fact it may be a just
and reasonable settlement of the minor's claim without an expensive
and lengthy trial. The objection is not to the friendly suit as such,
but to the procedure followed by the court between the time its juris-
diction is invoked and the time judgment is entered. The practice
in this respect may vary considerably from state to state. In some
states the "defendant's" counsel may represent both parties;6 the
whole proceeding may be nothing more than the exchange of legal
papers; perhaps only the lawyers appear and make representations
to the court; a brief hearing may be held; or the proceedings may
approach a real trial with witnesses being called.57
The procedure followed in the Robison case noted above was highly
objectionable. While the minor plaintiff was in the hospital, the
"defendant's" lawyer effected a settlement with him. The defendant's
counsel prepared both sides of the case. A next friend was appointed
who was a stranger to the infant, who never saw the infant, and who
did not attend the "trial." A justice of the peace entered judgment
at the infant's bedside for the agreed amount without inquiring into
the extent of the plaintiff's injuries, how he was injured, or other
pertinent facts. The supreme court of course held the minor was not
bound by the judgment. Such a friendly suit cannot be tolerated as
it strips the infant of all the safeguards the law has established for
his protection.
Contrasted to the Robison case is the procedure examined by an
intermediate Missouri appellate court in the recent case of Ebenreck'
53. Dixon, supra note 52, at 728.
54. JUD. COUNCIL REP'T 204.
55. 291 Mo. 34, 236 S.W. 332 (1921).
56. See Ed. Note, Compromise of Claimn Based Upon Personal Injuries to
Minori, 32 W. VA. L.Q. 235 (1926). This does not seem to be the practice in the
St. Louis area. The writer is not familiar with the practice in other parts of the
state.
57. Dixon, supra note 52, at 728.
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v. Union Service Co. s The infant's parents were appointed next
friends and each party was represented by independent counsel. The
parents testified as to the extent of the boy's injuries, what the doctors
had reported, and the apparent condition of the boy. The infant
himself was examined by the court. The agreed facts concerning how
the injury occurred were submitted to the court. In a later suit the
court's judgment for the infant plaintiff was held to be binding on the
infant because the court in the friendly suit proceeding had made a
judicial ascertainment of the facts, and the judgment was reasonable
when entered. The Ebenreck case does not represent a change of
policy in Missouri, nor a refusal to follow the Missouri Supreme
Court. Even in the Robison case the supreme court noted that where
the judgment is based on a real and not a perfunctory hearing it will
bind the infant. Again, the supreme court in Gilliland v. Bondurantlo
stated that an agreed judgment will be permitted to stand if the
minor is represented by his own counsel, who in good faith has pro-
tected the rights and interests of his immature client, and if the
court has made a real judicial ascertainment of the facts.
At least in the St. Louis area the present practice meets the require-
ments of the doctrine of the above cases. The courts probe into the
facts until they feel sure the settlement is just and reasonable. At
times affidavits and medical reports are required and doctors or other
parties may be called as witnesses. Actually the defendant himself
is anxious to have all the pertinent facts put before the court because
he fears the judgment may be set aside at a later time for failure of
the court to make a sufficient judicial determination of the facts. This
attitude is best evidenced by the Ebenreck case, where the defendant
called to the attention of the court the possibility that the minor may
have had a basal skull fracture, a fact the parents failed to mention.
Since the supreme court has sanctioned the practice, there seems to
be no jurisdictional objection, though technically, approving the
settlement of a minor's claim is in the jurisdiction of the probate
court through a guardian. 6 It should be noted that this jurisdictional
problem has not been clearly presented to the court. If it were, the
court would perhaps take a different attitude toward the friendly
suit procedure. As recognized by the supreme court, and as actually
conducted in at least the St. Louis area, however, the friendly suit is
the same as, or so nearly like, a trial that an appellate court would
be hard put at times to draw a ]ine between a judgment rendered in
such a suit and a judgment resulting from a bona fide lawsuit.
58. 276 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. App. 1955).
59. 332 Mo. 881, 59 S.W.2d 679 (1933).
60. See text at note 15 supra.
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Because of the procedure required by the supreme court, there
seems to be no valid objection to the friendly suit in Missouri insofar
as the interests of the parties are concerned. The infant is adequately
protected and the defendant obtains a release which is binding on
the minor.'- However, the whole proceeding is a fiction and requires
a great deal of wasted motion and time in filing all the papers neces-
sary to give the appearance of a bona fide lawsuit.
Another method frequently employed by attorneys to effect a
settlement is entirely extrajudicial. The tort-feasor, or frequently his
insurance company, will write a check payable to the minor and
his parent. In return the minor executes a release and the parent
promises to indemnify the maker of the check if, in the future, the
minor seeks to avoid the release and collect an additional amount.
This transaction is believed to be beneficial to the tort-feasor in two
respects: (1) if the minor does avoid the release, the tort-feasor may
[e ahIre to recover the amount of the settlement by suing the parent,
if fie is not judgment proof; (2) the minor upon reaching his majority
probably will not avoid the release and seek to collect an additional
amount knowing his parent will be liable for the sum already paid
by the tort-feasor.
From the minor's point of view such agreements are clearly in
derogation of every safeguard the legislature has sought to afford,
unless the infant feels free to avoid the release upon reaching his
majority, which, as pointed out above, is doubtful. First, there is no
assurance the amount of the settlement is adequate compensation for
the injuries sustained. Often a sum may seem rather large to the
pa rent who is of average means, when in fact the sum may be wholly
nadequate in light of the minor's injuries. Secondly, the check is
probably indorsed by the minor at the parent's direction and the
disposition of the proceeds cannot usually be ascertained. It may
be expended for the minor in matters where the parent has no legal
duty to expend sums for him. It may be spent on the fulfillment of
such duties, or may be expended for the benefit of the entire family
with or without an intention to replace the amount at a future time.
It is not the writer's purpose at this time to judge the relative merits
of these agreements, but only to point out objections to them which
have been suggested to the writer. It is not entirely beyond the realm
of possibility that if presented in a proper case-one in which the
settlement was inadequate and the court believed the purpose of the
indemnifying agreement was to coerce the minor into not avoiding
the release-the court may hold such agreements void as against
(;. F, valid criticisms of the friendly suit as practiced in other states see
Dixon, s ipra note 52, at 728: Ed. Note, Compro inse of Claims Based Upon Per-
wonal tnjnries to Minors, 32 W. VA. L.Q. 235 (1926).
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public policy. Of course, the question would be presented by a parent
defending a suit on such an agreement after the infant had previously
avoided the release.
(b) Attorneys' Fees
There should be noted at the outset certain theories which have
been advanced in an attempt to solve the problem of attorneys' fees,
but which have been rejected by the Missouri courts. It was thought
that since a minor is liable for services which are "necessaries," attor-
neys' fees for prosecuting the minor's claim could be so classified,
thus rendering the minor's estate liable. How could the minor prose-
cute without counsel? In Fenn v. Hart Dairy Co.,62 this theory was
rejected. The court adopted the test of an old Vermont case" stating
that necessaries are only those things which are of "necessity" to
the minor. The court then proceeded to give "necessity" its narrowest
meaning, stating that since the minor is not brought into court under
compulsion, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run on
his cause of action until he reaches majority, the suit is not a neces-
sity. Therefore, attorneys' fees arising from the prosecution of the
suit are not necessaries, even though the services are beneficial to the
minor 6 4 and it is thought to be desirable and in the best interest of
the minor to prosecute the suit.6 5
The Fenn case was indeed an unfortunate decision, for the court
created a situation in which attorneys representing minors can only
hope the minor does not dissaffirm his contract and either refuse to
pay or recover the attorney's fees. Attorneys could refuse to take
minors' tort claims, in which case the minor could only prosecute his
own suit or wait until he reached his majority to prosecute the suit.
In either case an inequitable situation is present. Another avenue
open to the minor and attorney is the appointment of a probate
guardian, which presents the difficulties previously noted. The only
62. 231 Mo. App. 1005, 83 S.W.2d 120 (1935).
63. Thrall v. Wright, 38 Vt. 494 (1865).
64. See Rhodes v. Frazier's Estate, 204 S.W. 547 (Mo. App. 1918).
65. It is interesting to note that § 475.265 of the 1956 Missouri Probate Code
which provides for the compensation of guardians, states that: "He [guardianf
may also be allowed compensation for necessary expenses in the administration
of his trust, including reasonable attorney fies if the employment of an attorney
for the particular purpose is necessary." (Emphasis added.) Will the doctrine
of Fenn v. Hart Dairy Co. be read into this new provision? Such a result would
be absurd because the guardian, with the approval of the probate court, could
no longer bind the minor's estate for reasonable attorneys' fees for prosecuting
the ward's suit. The portion of the section above quoted was taken verbatim from
the MODEL PROB. CODE § 232 (1946). A reading of the comment to § 232 makes
it obvious the authors did not consider the peculiar rule of the Fenn case. The
section was drafted with primary concern for guardianships arising out of de-
cendents' estates. However, an application of the Fenn rule to the new code pro-
vision is possible.
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other course would be to secure a third party, such as the parent, to
pay the fees. But it is hard to comprehend why such a burden should
be cast on the parent. It is hoped that if the question is presented
in the future, the supreme court will overrule the Fena case, a court
of appeals decision, and rule that attorneys' fees are necessaries.
There is no sound reason for not so holding-the trial judge can
control the amount of the fee to insure that it is reasonable and attor-
neys should receive compensation for services rendered whether they
are representing adults or minors.
Nor does the attorney's lien statute of Missouri" bind the infant.
The attorney's lien on a client's judgment is based on an express or
implied agreement; therefore, there must be a contract debt existing
between the client and attorney before the statute applies2 7 Since
the, minor can avoid his contract, there is no contract debt between
him and his attorney and the statute is inapplicablees In addition, the
minor is not liable for costs.' Therefore attorneys' fees cannot be
charged to the infant as a cost of bringing suit.
The practice employed to make sure the attorney receives his fees
presents a much more serious problem than that encountered in the
area of settlements. Usually, the court merely orders the next friend to
pay the attorney out of the proceeds of the minor's judgment. If the
judgment is rendered in a friendly suit the court may allow the
parent compensation for loss of services in the same proceeding.
Factually the damages for loss of services suffered by the parent are
generally nominal. A device sometimes used by attorneys is to make
the parent's claim for loss of services large enough to absorb the
attorney's fee, the parent then paying the attorney. Another method
is to enter judgment for the infant, the defendant agreeing to pay
the plaintiff's attorney. Both of these latter methods reduce the
minor's judgment by the amount awarded to the attorney, for the
def endant will not settle if he is required to make a fair and reasonable
settlement with the minor and in addition pay another one-third or
one-fourth to the attorney.
No one knows what will be the consequences of these practices.
The point has never been considered by an appellate court. Certainly
there are strong policy arguments favoring a holding sanctioning
these practices. To hold them invalid would subject many attorneys
to liability for past fees earned while representing minors. Such a
ruling would also put the minor in jeopardy of not being able to retain
4;(;. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 484.130-.140 (Vernon 1949).
6,7. Mills v. Metropolitan Street Ry., 282 Mo. 118, 221 S.W. 1 (1920); Fenn 'v.
Hart Dairy Co.. 2*31 Mo. App. 1005, 83 S.W. 120 (1935).
68. Fenn v. Hart Dairy Co., 231 Mo. App. 1005, 83 S.W.2d 120 (1935).
G9. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 507.180 (Vernon 1949).
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counsel unless some adult contracted to pay the attorney. On the
other hand, rulings upholding the practices would not be free from
severe criticism in light of existing law. For in the first practice
related, it seems clear the court and next friend are exceeding their
powers. Neither has the power to dispose of the funds constituting
the minor's estate.7 0 In the second and third situations mentioned,
it also seems clear the court is exercising a power of disposition over
the minor's estate though the method is somewhat indirect. If the
supreme court did uphold these practices it is hard to conceive what
theory it would adopt, unless it expressly overruled previous cases
stating that fees are not necessaries. It is indeed surprising that the
practices have prevailed so long without ever having been adjudicated.
Perhaps this is due to the ignorance of the minors and parents as to
the validity of the methods employed to pay the attorney.
It would seem that prompt legislative action in this area is desirable.
Attorneys cannot be expected to devote their time, energy, and skill
to minors free of charge. Also, the possibility that fees presently
earned will have to be repaid at some future time creates an in-
equitable situation. If the existing law were adhered to, it is likely
the minor would not be able to retain counsel unless a third party
contracted to pay the attorney because the attorney has no means to
enforce a claim for his fees; or a probate guardian would have to be
appointed with the attendant waste of the estate in paying costs of
administration.
(c) Protection of the Minor's Judgment
The circuit courts in the St. Louis area have protected the minor's
estate by ordering the next friend to deposit the funds in a bank.
Agreements are in force with various banks, or a judge may obtain
an agreement with a bank on each separate deposit, that such funds
are not to be withdrawn except by order of the circuit court or by
the minor upon reaching majority. Again it would appear the court
is exercising control and management over the minor's estate which
is in the exclusive original jurisdiction of the probate court. In West
St. Louis Trust Co. v. Brokaw71 the precise practice came before an
appellate court, which stated in no uncertain terms that the circuit
court had completely exceeded its jurisdiction in exercising such con-
trol over the funds. Despite this case the circuit courts in the St.
Louis area have persisted in the practice. Recently the piactice in the
city of St. Louis has been slightly altered. While the circuit court
orders the funds to be deposited, it is only by order of the probate
70. West St. Louis Trust Co. v. Brokaw, 232 Mo. App. 209, 102 S.W.2d 792(1937).
71. Id. at 213, 102 S.W.2d at 794.
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vourt that the funds can be withdrawn. The circuit court is still
txceeding its jurisdiction in ordering the deposit. The probate court,
however, will not order a withdrawal of the funds unless an estate
is opened for the minor in the probate court. This in turn requires
the annual fees and reports with their concurrent expenses. This
practice does have a very desirable feature, however. As long as no
estate is opened in the probate court the funds can be withdrawn only
by the minor when he reaches majority. Therefore, they stay in the
bank accumulating interest. How long parents desirous of "milking"
the estate, if possible, will allow the situation to exist will depend on
the in(dividual case. Quite possibly a parent anxious to "get his hands
,M the money" will have an estate opened for the minor in the probate
.,trt. If the probate court were to order withdrawals without an
vstate being open (without having a guardian appointed) it would,
Of course, be acting beyond its jurisdiction. The practice of ordering
the funds deposited subject to withdrawal only by order of the
probate court is not followed by the circuit courts of St. Louis County,
however. The county courts continue to order the funds deposited
subject to withdrawal on their own order. Thus, there is an indica-
tia of a lack of uniformity throughout the state. The Brokaw case
could be considered dictum on the point, but if any presumptions are
to be made it must be presumed the court would so hold today. In
addition, circuit court judges do not deny they are exceeding their
it risdiction in continuing the practice of ordering the deposit of the
ulods.
Again the effect of this practice is not known. If the next friend
fails or refuses to deposit the funds and dissipates them, is he in con-
tempt, for disobeying an order the court had no power to make? If so,
does this do the minor any good? The next friend may be insolvent.
0r suppose through error the bank allows the next friend to draw
out the proceeds without an order of court. Is the bank now liable?
Can the bank be held in contempt of court when the court lacked
power to make the agreement? To whom should it be liable? True,
th, funds are the minor's, but the next friend must be trustee for
the court cannot be-it has no power over the funds, and the next
friend is the depositor. Would the judge who ordered the deposit be
hable? Has he acted so far beyond his power that he is not protected
by the cloak of judicial immunity? These are merely considerations
ntended to show the uncertainty of the situation. Fortunately these
problems do not seem to arise.
While the research has not extended into areas beyond St. Louis
it is thought pertinent to point out other practices which may exist
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in other areas. A recent survey72 has shown that in some areas in the
United States (not specifically denominated) the court merely turns
the funds over to the next friend, who is generally the parent, with-
out any effort to safeguard them. A court in Missouri would be
legally justified in adopting this practice since in Missouri the next
friend has the right to receive the proceeds and the court has no
jurisdiction over the funds.7 3 It is thought that perhaps in rural
areas, where the judge knows the parent personally and knows he
could use the funds, possibly for a new tractor, etc., such a procedure
may be followed. Such a disposition of the minor's estate is not
unlikely, for judges in St. Louis have in the past authorized with-
drawals for new trucks, to pay the rent, to pay for the groceries, and
other similar expenditures on the theory that the minor is indirectly
benefited. It seems legislation in this area also is sorely needed. The
method of protecting the minor's estate should be uniform through-
out the state. The minor should be assured his estate is being ade-
quately safeguarded. It is the minor who has sustained the injury
and not his parents, or his brothers and sisters. Such protection should
not be left to chance or to what the individual judge decides is best.
IV. CONCLUSION
The criticisms of the present practices are not intended to cast
aspersions on the circuit courts, at least not on the circuit courts of
the St. Louis area. As is sometimes the case, the judges have found
themselves with a statutory scheme which seems adequate when read,
but when applied to real situations is inadequate. The courts have
done an admirable job in protecting the various interests involved.
However, courts have enough responsibility without being put to
the task of exceeding their jurisdiction in an attempt to do justice.
A basic feature of the Missouri statutory scheme is to vest the
control and management of a minor's estate in the guardian appointed
by the probate court. The incorporation of this concept into the
present practice would provide acceptable solutions to the problems
dealt with here.7 4 The first recommendation is to require by statute
that no minor's tort claim be settled or prosecuted to judgment unless
a guardian has been appointed by the probate court. It is submitted
72. Dixon, supr note 52, at 728.
-73. See text at notes 40, 73 supra.
74. A committee in New York made a recent study of similar problems exist-
ing in that state. Results of the study were published in the State of New York
Judicial Council's Thirteenth Annual Report and Studies. The recommendations
of the committee were subsequently enacted by the New York legislature. While
some of the features of these recommendations have been adopted in the proposed
legislation for Missouri, the bulk of the New York provisions are rejected. It is
felt that as applied to Missouri's existing law the New York proposals would be
unnecessarily long and involved.
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that a minor's tort claim is a part of his estate-it is of potential
value.7,' Therefore, the recommended provision would extend the con-
cept of guardian control and management of the minor's estate to
the minor's tort claim. A guardian can be appointed in a few minutes
and with little expense.
Since a guardian would be required, the problems of attorneys' fees
and settlements would be adequately provided for. The guardian,
with the approval of the probate court, would bind the infant for
reasonable attorneys' fees and, similarly, the guardian, with the ap-
proval of the probate court, would be able to effect a settlement and
execute to the defendant a release binding on the minor. This, in
fact, would abolish the friendly suit in the circuit court since the
probate court would approve the settlement of the guardian. When
a minor has a guardian and is subsequently injured, the guardian
may enter into a settlement which is then presented directly to the
probate court. No formal suit need be instituted as in the circuit
court's friendly suit. The procedure of approving the settlement in
the probate court is the same as that adopted in the circuit court;
,."., the court may call witnesses and doctors until satisfied that the
settlement is reasonable.-
Thus far, by one simple enactment, the attorneys' fees problem has
been dealt with and a binding release for the defendant has been
secured, without resorting to the fiction and wasted motion of the
friendly suit. There remains to be considered the protection of the
funds for the minor. It will be recalled that the present objection to
the appointment of a guardian in the area of small tort claims is
that, in many instances, annual costs would consume all or a large
75. Fenn v. Hart Dairy Co., 231 Mo. App. 1005, 83 S.W.2d 120 (1935) (stat-
utes in Missouri are designed to subject the affairs of minors to the jurisdiction
of the probate court through a guardian).
763. In New York it was thought best to allow the courts of general jurisdic-
tion (circuit courts in Missouri) to retain control over the approval of settle-
ments of minors' tort claims. The reasoning appeared to be that since these
courts deal with the problems of tort claims daily they would be better qualified
to determine the reasonableness of any given settlement. Out of nine states
adopting procedures in this area similar to that of New York, only two have
allowed the courts of general jurisdiction to retain this control. JUD. COUNCIL
REP'T.
Although the New York position merits consideration, it is not necessary that
circuit courts retain this power in order to protect the minor adequately. As the
probate judge is a lawyer, the area of tort is not foreign to him. Approving a
settlement of a minor's claim which will be fair and reasonable depends more
on the exercise of conunon sense and the sense of duty possessed by a particularjudge than it does on any technical knowledge of the law of torts.
The Missouri statutes have given the probate courts primary control over
minors. It will be recalled that funds deposited by the circuit court are now
made subject to withdrawal by order of the probate court if an estate is opened
in the latter court. One of the reasons for this recent change was tih+ __
circuit court judges were too liberal in allowing the parent to make withdrawals.
It was believed that since the probate court dealt more frequently with minors'
estates, tlat court was better qualified to protect the interests of the minor.
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part of the minor's estate. This can be corrected by authorizing both
the probate court and the circuit court to order funds deposited sub-
jected to a "limited withdrawal."
If the funds are awarded to the minor in a probate court settle-
ment, the court would be authorized to order the guardian to deposit
the funds subject to withdrawal only by order of the court. The
guardian would merely sign necessary papers authorizing the deposit
and, in fact, the court would deposit the proceeds. Since the guardian
would never handle the funds or be able to withdraw them unless the
court authorized such a withdrawal, the necessity for a bond and
annual reports would no longer exist. The statute imposing these
requirements would be amended to read that bond and annual reports
are required unless otherwise provided for by law. The "limited
withdrawal" provision recommended would specifically except the
bond and report requirements where the court orders a limited with-
drawal deposit.
If the minor realizes a judgment as a result of a bona fide lawsuit
prosecuted by his appointed guardian in the circuit court, that court
would have the power to order the proceeds deposited subject to
"limited withdrawal" by order of the probate court. At first this may
be thought to violate the probate court's exclusive original jurisdiction
often referred to. It is to be remembered, however, that the probate
court does not acquire such jurisdiction from the constitution, but
from the construction of several statutes.7 The constitution merely
provides that the probate court shall appoint guardians. That re-
quirement is fulfilled in the recommendations herein set forth. Since
the legislature has conferred exclusive original jurisdiction to manage
and control the minor's estate on the probate court, it can, in the
limited withdrawal provision, create an exception to the probate
jurisdiction by allowing the circuit court to deposit the proceeds of
judgment subject to withdrawal only by order of the probate court.
Therefore, through one provision requiring the appointment of a
guardian, and conferring power on the probate and circuit courts to
deposit funds, and another amending the bond and annual report pro-
vision, the problems of settlements, attorneys' fees, and protection
of the minor's estate would be adequately provided for by statute.75
DOMINIC TROIANI
77. See II (a) supra.
78. The protection of minors' estates other than those resulting from tort
claims is beyond the scope of this note. However, if the legislature were to enact
corrective legislation it would do well to consider the protection of small estates
acquired in other ways, e.g., through wills. The corrective legislation proposed
in the text as far as is applicable would seem to be equally desirable for any
small estate which is under the supervision of the probate court through a
guardian.
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